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“… the patent system is inherently political. This implies that its design and reform will 
never be based on legal nicety, scientific fact or disinterested economic calculation alone. 
Politics is almost inevitably a part of the equation, and nowhere more so than in the life 
sciences field ...” (Graham Dutfield 2009, p. 4)  
“I hate Myriad [Genetics] the way some people hate Goldman Sachs. [By patenting genes], 
they made enormous profits [but] they are also raising the cost of medicine.” (James 
Watson, April 28, 2010) 
“The danger isn’t that Craig Venter has become God, it is that he might become Bill Gates. 
We do not want a monopolist over the code of life.” (James Boyle, May 28, 2010) 
  
 
Introduction 
Forecasting is a rather hazardous exercise, especially if the aim is to predict the future. Any  
sketch of the likely development of synthetic biology in the near and more remote future is 
speculative, as would be an outline of expected trends in patent law. So an exercise in which 
these two forecasts or explorations are to be combined, would be doubly speculative. The 
problem becomes even worse if we have to zoom in on the medical applications of synthetic 
biology and the legal and moral issues they are going to raise with regard to property and 
ownership – because it is not yet very clear what medical applications may stem from 
synthetic biology in the short and middle term. To raise the question, ‘Should we patent 
synthetic biology products when they are related to human health?’ – as the outline of the 
program for this workshop does – may be useful and admirable as an attempt to force the 
issue and bring matters to a head, but also seems to betray a certain political naiveté.  One 
might also think that the picture for medical synthetic biology is still too hazy to make any 
discussion of the need for a new legal framework for patents in this special field opportune 
and fruitful at this early day. 
Consulting the SYBHEL website does not help us much in finding any clues and leads to 
develop a more elaborate position with regard to the questions raised. One issue that is 
mentioned is the ethical implications of “creating life” – indeed an issue that is already widely 
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discussed but one that does not relate specifically to medical applications (I have indulged to 
engage in that debate myself, see Van den Belt 2009b). It is furthermore stated that synbio 
“may alter our conceptual understanding of the nature of health, well-being, disease and 
therapy”. This may be a rather grand claim. My impression is that many of my colleagues in 
philosophy and ethics and in science and technology studies (STS) are fond of making such 
claims. It would be rather trivial and prosaic to simply say that new developments in medical 
science have an impact on our health and well-being and enlarge the therapeutic arsenal to 
combat the diseases from which we suffer, so it sounds much more exciting to say that our 
conceptual understanding itself is affected by such developments. But when exactly would it 
be justified to claim that our concepts of what it means to be ill or healthy have been altered? 
(Did the conquest of tuberculosis in the developed world alter our very concepts of disease 
and health? It certainly brought an end to the enchanted world of the Magic Mountain!) My 
point is that ELSI scholars should be wary of hyperbolic claims that may play too easily into 
the strategic schemes of raising great expectations for a new field of science and technology 
(cf. Alfred Nordmann’s [2007] criticism of speculative ‘if-and-then’ ethics). Some skepticism 
would also be appropriate with regard to the claim that “Synbio could help design truly 
personalized drugs specific to individual needs”, as this seems just a recycling of the old 
promise that genomics and nutrigenomics raised about ten years ago but were unable to fulfill 
in the past decade.1 
What then would be the best approach, in the light of the difficulties and pitfalls sketched 
above, to tackle the legal and moral issues raised by synthetic biology and its medical 
applications with regard to property and patenting? My preferred strategy would be a two-
pronged approach. On the one hand I would like to put contemporary developments in a 
historical perspective. This provides some immunity against the hypes and exaggerated 
expectations that inevitably surround a new field like synthetic biology. The rise of synbio can 
be seen as a continuation, and provisional culmination, of some longer-term trends that are 
characteristic of major strands in western science and technology, e.g. the “informatisation” of 
life since the beginnings of molecular biology or the attempted implementation of the Kant-
Vico-Feynman principle “What I cannot create I do not understand”, which has previously 
been followed in organic chemistry (Van den Belt 2009a). Synbio is also a continuation and 
radicalization of genetic engineering or biotechnology. Thus there is historical continuity as 
well as discontinuity. That also applies to the development of patent law (or more broadly 
                                                          
1 The SYBHEL website also mentions the ‘poster-child’ of synthetic biology (or more 
exactly metabolic engineering): the synthetic production of a pre-cursor of artemisinin (an 
effective anti-malarial drug) by Jay Keasling’s team at Berkeley, funded by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. The website remarks: “Ironically, however, this scientific 
development could have a detrimental impact on the communities in developing countries 
who currently produce the rare precursor to amorphadiene as a synthetic substitute could 
cause a loss of value of the product supports their livelihood.” This issue has been discussed 
more extensively in a brochure of the Ottawa-based ETC Group (see ETC Group 2007, pp. 
52-55). One would like to know how specific and idiosyncratic this particular case is, and 
how compelling the evidence is on which it is based. Does it really cast an ethical shadow 
over the synthetic artemisinin initiative? To what extent could the lesson be extrapolated to 
similar initiatives involving synthetic biology? Such questions are still hanging in the balance. 
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intellectual property law). It is very important to realize that “the history of intellectual 
property rights is a history of contestation” (May and Sell 2006), so as to avoid the widely 
held misconception that IP issues have become controversial only recently. The other prong 
of my two-pronged approach would be to give free reign to the moral imagination by 
proliferating possible scenarios for the future of IP and synbio (as was done in a major study 
commissioned by the EPO) and by elaborating institutional re-designs explicitly aimed at the 
normative goal of global justice (as is done, for example, by Thomas Pogge and other 
advocates of the Health Impact Fund). In a sense, this is making a virtue out of necessity, as it 
is openly acknowledged that the future is radically uncertain. The two prongs of my approach 
are held together by an historically informed interpretation of the current international 
situation in IP law as representing a major political contest between two frames, namely the 
“IP frame” and the “A2K frame” (access-to-knowledge frame) (Kapczynski 2009). The first 
frame has dominated the past three decades, but the latter frame is in the ascendance.  
Technology-neutrality of patents versus “co-construction” 
The debate on synbio and patents is often framed by the prior assumption that the patent 
system is, or should be, “neutral” with regard to the kind of technologies for which legal 
protection is being sought. This neutrality is even enshrined in the TRIPS agreement. Article 
27.1 states that “… patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application”. Thus in a recent article on synbio and patents, EPO 
official Berthold Rutz remarked: “One of the reasons for the long-lasting success of the patent 
system is its non-discriminatory character. The same basic patentability criteria apply to all 
fields of technology: novelty, inventive step and industrial application” (Rutz 2009, S14).2 
I think the technology-neutrality of the patent system is a myth. There has never been a patent 
system that is completely or even approximately “technology-neutral”, nor can there be such a 
system. The myth presumes that the three basic requirements can be applied to any newly 
emerging field of technology in a straightforward and “mechanical” way, without needing 
much additional interpretation. It also passes over the problem of  patentable subject matter.  
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS agreement unjustifiably grants the moral high ground to 
pharmaceutical companies opposing provisions in national patent laws that exclude product 
patents for drugs, as if “Thou shalt not discriminate!” were the first of the Ten 
Commandments in patent legislation. In the past, however, many countries (e.g. Germany, 
Italy, India) have excluded medicines from patenting on the legitimate and respectful grounds 
that this would serve public health best. What deserves ethical censure is rather that such 
provisions have been outlawed by the TRIPS agreement. At any rate, patents in the area of 
health have always been a sensitive issue.3 Thus Howard Florey and his team at Oxford 
                                                          
2 Despite these opening remarks, Rutz acknowledges that the emergence of new technologies 
regularly raises questions about the working of the patent system. He also deals with the 
question whether the latter is still suitable with regard to inventions in synbio. Why, then, 
does he pay lip-service to the principle of technology-neutrality of the patent system?  
3 Significantly, in former times, so-called “patent medicines” (although seldom actually 
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University did not file patents on penicillin in 1940-41 “because patenting was then against 
ethical medical principles” (Macfarlane 1980, 369).  The earlier example of insulin (1920-21) 
is only an apparent exception: “… medical men, such as Macleod and Banting, were bound by 
their profession’s code to make all advances in health care freely available to humanity… [I]t 
would violate a physician’s Hippocratic oath to engage in the profiting from a discovery that 
patenting normally implied” (Bliss 1988, 133). When the University of Toronto nonetheless 
decided to patent the insulin extract it was only as a purely defensive measure that would stop 
nobody from making the extract: “In fact the point was to stop anyone from ever being in a 
position to stop anyone else” (ibid.). In others words, the university made an attempt at 
“copylefting” the patent system. Finally, when Jonas Salk was asked in the 1950s why he 
hadn’t patented his polio vaccine, he is famously reported to have answered: “Can you patent 
the sun?”. (However, his legacy does not prevent the Jonas Salk Foundation today from 
aggressively patenting as much of their research outcomes as they can, including new 
vaccines.)  
If technology-neutrality were really a sacrosanct principle of patent law, it would hardly be 
defensible and in fact downright inconsistent for the TRIPS agreement to allow Members to 
exclude diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods (Art. 27.3.a) or plants and animals from 
patentability (Art. 27.3.b). (For plants, Members must provide either protection by patents or 
an effective sui generis system of plant variety protection or any combination thereof.) 
However, the proponents of plant and animal biotechnology have no reason to complain about 
“discrimination”, as the North American and European patent authorities have granted very 
special concessions to the holders of patents in this area by allowing them to also claim the 
transgenic offspring of genetically modified organisms and to extend the protection of 
patented genes to every organism in which such genes may be found, thus turning “natural” 
processes of reproduction and multiplication potentially into acts of infringement (as is 
illustrated by the notorious case of Monsanto versus Percy Schmeiser). Around 1900 the 
influential German jurist Josef Kohler argued that patents on living, self-reproducing 
organisms would be absurd because “patent law can govern only human action, it cannot 
constrain nature in those cases in which nature causes everything or at least the main part” 
(see the discussion of his views in Van den Belt 2009a, 1322-1326). Patent law in western 
countries has moved a long way from Kohler’s common sense. 
Against the myth of technology-neutrality we can put the idea of the “co-production” or “co-
evolution” of technology and patent law. In science and technology studies (STS) it is indeed 
not unusual to conceive of the relationship between science/technology and society (or the 
social, legal and political order) as one of mutual shaping, thus avoiding the extremes of 
scientific/technological determinism and social determinism. When a new field of technology 
emerges, patent law does not provide a list of ready-made criteria by which the technical 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
patented) had acquired a rather notorious reputation (cf. “snake oil”). An editorial comment in 
the American Journal of Public Health stated in 1926: “One of the glories of the medical 
profession has been that discoveries for the betterment of mankind and the relief of suffering 
have always been given freely to the public.[…] Patent and proprietary medicines have been 
and are a stench in the nostrils of the profession” (Editorial 1926).  
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accomplishments in the new field can be judged as patentable inventions. Instead, the 
conditions of patentability have first to be worked out and elaborated vis-à-vis the new 
technology, if only because the notion of “invention” is not strictly and universally defined 
but open to historically variable interpretation.4 Thus with the rise of synthetic dye chemistry 
in the second half of the 19th century decisions had to be made about the precise meaning and 
scope of “a particular process” to which the German Patent Act of 1877 had limited the 
patentability of chemical inventions; or on how high (or rather low) the bar for inventiveness 
had to be put to allow the patenting of “inventions” routinely produced on a large scale by the 
new R&D laboratories of the chemical industry (Van den Belt and Rip 1987). As a major 
stakeholder, the German chemical industry often lobbied vigorously to influence the shaping 
of patent law (see also Dutfield 2009).  
The development of patent law and biotechnology provides another clear example of “co-
construction” or “co-evolution”. The first question to be answered was if this part of law 
applied at all to this new area of technology. In the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
a 5-to-4 majority of the US Supreme Court held in 1980 that anything new under the sun that 
is made by man, whether living or non-living, can in principle be patented. Chief Justice 
Burger argued on behalf of the majority: “[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; according it is 
patentable subject matter under § 101.” This verdict occasioned a huge capital influx into the 
emerging biotech industry in the following years.5 During the 1980s the patentability of living 
organisms was further extended from bacteria to multi-cellular organisms and to higher plants 
and animals (cf. the “oncomouse” patent of 1988). Equally important for the biotech industry 
was that patents on isolated and purified genes and DNA sequences have also been 
recognized as legally valid. The reasoning behind this view was that a gene is just a chemical 
compound and that the isolation and purification of a particular DNA sequence from the body 
turns it in something radically different from its natural state and thus into an invention 
eligible for patenting.6 This doctrine would seem to be a rather thin justification – the 
Australian jurist Luigi Palombi disparagingly calls it the “isolation contrivance” (Palombi 
2009, 205-225) – but nonetheless it has provided the legal underpinning for the practice of 
                                                          
4 In 1886 an official Commission of Inquiry on the German Patent Law appropriately spoke 
about “der im Culturleben flüssige und wandelbare Begriff der Erfindung” (the culturally 
fluid and variable concept of invention). The Commission was against an explicit definition, 
as this would frustrate the needed “vernünftige Ermessen” (reasonable judgment). See Die 
Chemische Industrie 10 (1887): 379.   
5 Together with the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allowed universities to take out patents on 
the results of federally funded research, it also led to a rapid commercialization of molecular 
biology. In the introduction to his novel Jurassic Park, the late Michael Crichton wrote in 
1991: “The commercialization of molecular biology is the most stunning ethical event in the 
history of science, and it has happened with astonishing speed”. 
6 This view is often presented as if it were a logical consequence of the Chakrabarty decision, 
but Palombi argues that the case for patents on isolated and purified genes would not pass the 
US Supreme Court’s criteria, as such genes do not have “markedly different” characteristics 
from their natural counterparts (Palombi 2009).  
 6 
granting gene patents by the US, European and Japanese patent office for more than two 
decades.7 By 2005, it was found that some 20 percent or one-fifth of human genes had already 
been captured by US patents (Jensen and Murray 2005). One can therefore imagine that the 
recent decision by Judge Robert Sweet on May 29, 2010, in the high-profile case against the 
patents of Myriad Genetics on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes related to breast and ovarian 
cancer, must have sent shock waves through the entire biotech industry. Judge Sweet 
dismissed the isolation doctrine as a “lawyer’s trick” and declared that human genes constitute 
unpatentable subject matter (Schwartz and Pollack 2010). The biotech industry hopes that his 
decision will be reversed by the higher courts. 
From about 1980, modern biotechnology has “co-evolved” not just with patent law, but also 
with other parts of the social and political order. Indeed, the extension of patentable subject 
matter to include genes and DNA sequences, cultivated cells and tissues and transgenic 
organisms was itself part of a wider movement of strengthening and extending intellectual 
property rights (not just patents, but also copyrights and breeders’ rights) on national, regional 
and worldwide scales that fitted well with a neoliberal agenda of privatization, globalization 
and the reduction of the public sector.8 In recent years, however, this dominant “IP frame” is 
increasingly challenged by the “A2K frame” or “access-to-knowledge frame” (Kapczynski 
2009). 
One possible effect of “co-construction” or “co-evolution” between technology and patent law 
is that it may lead to path effects that may in turn give rise to mismatches between subsequent 
technologies and intellectual property regulation. Thus the proliferation of patents covering 
hundreds of thousands of genes or DNA sequences on the human genome and the genomes of 
other organisms, a direct outcome of the prior “co-evolution” of classical biotechnology and 
patent law, may constitute a formidable obstacle for the development and application of new 
technologies like DNA-microarrays (“gene chips”) and whole-genome sequencing. Synbio 
will also have to confront the legal legacy of the biotech gold rush. 
                                                          
7 In 1988 the European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Japanese 
Patent Office issued the following joint statement: “Purified natural products are not regarded 
under any of the three laws [US; EU; Japan] as products of nature or discoveries because they 
do not in fact exist in nature in an isolated form. Rather, they are regarded for patent purposes 
as biologically active substances or chemical compounds and eligible for patenting on the 
same basis as other chemical compounds.” It may be noted that in Europe the patentability of 
genes and DNA sequences was only officially established with the passing of the European 
Directive for the Protection of Biotechnological Inventions in 1998 (European Directive 
98/44/EC), so the EPO already ran ahead of the political decision.  
8 Amy Kapczynski cites William Landes and Richard Posner, who point to the “free-market 
ideology” that came to prominence in the late 1970s and argue that “it was natural for free-
market ideologists to favor an expansion of intellectual property rights” (Landes and Posner, 
quoted in Kapczynski 2008, 842). However, a longer historical perspective should warn us 
against the “naturalness” of a close relation between economic liberalism and a pro-IP stance. 
In the mid-19th century the adherents of Free Trade in Europe were generally against patents, 
which they saw as obsolete “privileges” of the Ancien Régime and as impediments of free 
competition.   
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Synbio at the crossroads 
It is not difficult to understand why patents could be a major threat to the realization of that 
particular strand of synbio that aims at the construction of complex biological systems on the 
basis of well-defined standard parts, i.e. genetic sequences with known functions that can be 
used as building blocks in biological syntheses. Construction of one biological system may 
easily require hundreds or even more than 1000 different components. If only a small 
percentage of the needed parts were encumbered with patents (or other IP constraints), it 
could become prohibitively costly to obtain “freedom to operate” to assemble the entire 
system. A patent thicket would doom the prospects of this strand of synbio: “One roadblock 
to synbio’s future is the messed-up patent environment in biotech, where every tiny protein 
pathway and gene sequence has an owner wanting to get paid … [U]nless basic components 
are made freely available it will be too expensive to make anything useful or complex” 
(Herper 2006).  
Deeply concerned that their fledgling field could be smothered already in its cradle, several 
synbio enthusiasts from MIT, Harvard and the University of California have set up the 
BioBricks Foundation, which administers the Registry of Standard Biological Parts, a steadily 
growing online collection of parts on which synbio practitioners can draw at will to engineer 
new life forms and to which they can contribute their own components. From the outset 
leaders of the field like Drew Endy and Tom Knight have also been groping for suitable legal 
instruments to ensure that BioBrick™ standard biological parts remain freely available to the 
synbio community. They have been inspired by the open source movement in software 
development, which uses copyright law in a creative way by devising licenses like the GPL or 
General Public License (“copyleft”) to ensure that newly written software code is not 
privately appropriated but remains free to use for all. The problem for synbio is that legal 
devices like the GPL that are based on copyright law cannot easily be transferred to the 
biological field. Due to its “viral” effect a GPL-like license might also be considered too 
strong in that it would prevent the patenting of any final products such as pharmaceuticals that 
could be made by synbio methods. It is all very well to keep the basic tools and building 
blocks freely available to the research community, but some synthetic biologists argue that 
such a viral effect would be undesirable as patents are still a cornerstone in our current system 
of pharmaceutical innovation. The legal experts Arti Rai and James Boyle advise the synbio 
community to follow the example of the (public leg of the) Human Genome Project and make 
new building blocks publicly available as soon as possible: “Placing parts into the public 
domain not only makes parts unpatentable, but it undermines the possibility of patents on 
trivial improvements” (Rai and Boyle 2007, 392). This strategy does not provide a watertight 
guarantee, however, that such parts will be preserved for the public domain or the commons. 
It is not certain either whether the parts that are already in the Registry are unencumbered by 
any patent rights. On a workshop held in Berkeley on March 31, 2006, Drew Endy estimated 
or rather speculated that perhaps one-fifth of Biobricks parts were patented. So it is not 
unthinkable that in future when synbio yields commercially interesting applications in the 
fields of health, energy or bioremediation, “patent trolls” claiming intellectual ownership of 
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some of the used parts may suddenly turn up to assert their rights. In October 2009 the so-
called BioBrick™ Public Agreement (BPA) was proposed as a new legal framework for 
regulating the rights and duties of the contributors and users of the parts collection. Basically, 
the Agreement amounts to “an irrevocable promise not to assert any property rights held by 
the Contributor over Users of the contributed Materials” (http://bbf.openwetware.org/BPA). It 
has no viral effect, so it does not prevent users employing parts from the collection to patent 
any final products they may develop from these starting materials. One might question 
whether this proposed arrangement provides sufficient incentives for potential contributors to 
donate their materials to the Registry (Henkel and Maurer 2009, 1097). The BPA is currently 
still being discussed in the synbio community.  
There is no doubt that the synthetic biologists who established the BioBricks Foundation are 
strongly committed to open-source principles and an ethos of sharing, but they too are forced 
to accommodate to the realities of an IP-dominated world. Their attempt to carve out a little 
niche of a commons comprising the building blocks and basic tools of their trade thus 
continues to rest on a fragile legal base.  
The BioBricks approach is not the only strand in synbio. There is also the “chassis school” 
represented by Craig Venter and his team. Their favored procedure is to assemble a “minimal 
genome” (i.e. a microbial genome stripped of all dispensable genes) from synthesized DNA, 
transplant it into a recipient cell whose own genome has been removed, and use the artificial 
creature thus obtained as a “chassis” upon which all kinds of economically useful genes can 
be mounted.  On 31 May 2007 the US Patent and Trademark Office caused a stir when it 
published the patent application that the J. Craig Venter Institute had filed in October 2006 on 
a new artificial life form called Mycoplasma laboratorium (US Patent Application 
20070122826, filed 12 October 2006). The announcement was somewhat premature, because 
the first artificial creature was only to see the light of day almost three years later, on 29 
March 2010. However, the claims of the first patent application, to which other applications 
would follow, were already quite sweeping. They are formulated successively as of 
increasingly wider scope. Thus the set of 381 essential genes making up a “minimal bacterial 
genome” is being claimed (claim 1); the synthetic organism that can be made from these 
genes; any variant of the organism that can produce ethanol or hydrogen (claim 20);  any 
scientific method for assessing the functions of genes by inserting those genes into the 
synthetic organism (claim 22); and any digital version of the synthetic organism’s genome 
(claim 19). Among the intended applications the creation of synthetic organisms for the 
production of biofuels like ethanol and hydrogen is particularly emphasized. At present, such 
applications may sound futuristic, but it seems that Venter wants to signal to the general 
public that his enterprises (consisting  not only of the nonprofit J. Craig Venter Institute but 
also of the private company Synthetic Genomics, Inc.; patent rights will all be assigned to the 
latter) intend to play a key role in solving the urgent problems of energy supply and climate 
change. In his Richard Dimbleby Lecture delivered on 4 December 2007 on BBC One, he 
went so far as to suggest that synbio may save the world and effectively constitute humanity’s 
last chance for survival (Venter 2007). 
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Contrary to the BioBricks school, which attempts to establish a practice of sharing inspired by 
open-source models in software development, Venter continues the strategy of aggressive 
patenting of classical biotechnology with a vengeance. The two strands of synbio thus 
illustrate the tension between the old “IP frame” and the new “A2K frame” (Kapczynski 
2009).    
The suite of patents that the J. Craig Venter Institute subsequently filed also have very broad 
claims. John Sulston, Venter’s old rival in the race to sequence the human genome, recently 
sounded the alarm on the extremely wide scope of the claims in the patent applications, 
suggesting that they might, if granted, give Venter’s enterprise a monopoly on a wide range of 
techniques (Chan and Sulston 2010). James Boyle also warns that Venter might become “a 
monopolist over the code of life” and that the efforts of the BioBricks community to create an 
open source collection of standard biological parts might be endangered by “the threat of 
overbroad patents on foundational technologies” (Boyle 2010).  
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the plans of Venter’s company Synthetic 
Genomics Inc. to develop highly advanced “fourth-generation” biofuels using carbon dioxide 
as feedstock will indeed come true and that the new techniques as a matter of course will be 
heavily protected by patents. This would conjure up the morally problematic scenario in 
which technological solutions that might be humanity’s last hope for survival (as Venter 
himself suggested in his lecture before the BBC) are locked up in patents that serve to make 
them inaccessible to any but the most wealthy users. The company will have to tell its 
impecunious non-clients: “Sorry, you won’t be saved, if you are not willing to pay the price of 
your survival!”. But in this case, unlike the users of  high-priced patented medicines that are 
effectively denied to poor patients, the wealthy users of expensive high-tech biofuels won’t be 
saved either. Climate change will not be sufficiently mitigated if only the wealthy inhabitants 
of the earth use “climate-neutral” energy. 
Important medical applications of Venter’s synbio approach are expected in the area of 
vaccine development. In October 2010 his institute and his company set up a new venture, 
Synthethic Genomics Vaccines Inc. (SGVI), in collaboration with the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company Novartis, to develop next-generation vaccines. The J. Craig Venter Institute will 
bring its synthetic genomic research expertise to this venture, “coupled with the intellectual 
property and business acumen of SGI [Synthetic Genomics Inc.]” (press release October 7, 
2010). The direct aim of the venture is to accelerate the production of the influenza seed 
strains required for vaccine manufacturing, so that the time needed to start vaccine production 
can be cut short by two months (with the so-called swine flu “pandemic” of 2009 serious 
vaccine production only got started after the peak of the “pandemic” was over). This is a 
respectable aim, of course (though one might question whether the world might be “prepared” 
in time if a pandemic outbreak of the rapidity and seriousness of the Spanish flu of 1918 
would strike again, even with a time saving of two months). There is no doubt, however, that 
the new venture will pursue a strategy of aggressive patenting. Yet the area of vaccine 
development for influenza epidemics is precisely an area where intellectual property rights 
clash with global public health needs (Andrews and Shackelton 2008). Under the rules of the 
WHO countries affected by flu outbreaks are expected to send samples of viruses to the 
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WHO’s collaborating research centers and laboratories, which are all located in the USA, 
Europe or Japan. These laboratories cooperate with western pharmaceutical companies that 
take out patents on genetic sequences and vaccines derived from these virus samples (for an 
expert report on patentability issues related to viruses, see WIPO 2007). Developing countries 
contributing samples to the WHO are often unpleasantly surprised when they subsequently 
find out that they cannot afford the patented vaccines that are developed from these materials. 
No wonder then that in 2007, during the avian flu epidemic, Indonesia refused to further share 
its H5N1 virus samples if it would not get access to affordable vaccines (Hammond 2009). 
This is a very serious threat as worldwide sharing of virus samples is a vital requirement for 
the effective working of WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network. Within the WHO 
parties are still negotiating about access and benefit-sharing arrangements for virus samples 
and vaccines.    
As the above examples of biofuels and vaccines illustrate, we have to consider patent issues in 
the broader context of sustainable development and global health and global justice. 
Moreover, the traditional justification of intellectual property rights as indispensible 
incentives for innovation is increasingly challenged as alternative models have emerged in the 
wake of the open-source movement. Chan and Sulston put the controversy over Venter’s 
patents in the perspective of an epochal confrontation between the IP frame and the A2K 
frame: “The conflict between private interests in science, protected by patents and cloaked in 
secrecy, and open access research remains one of the most contentious issues in modern 
science and affects us all” (Chan and Sulston 2010, 1316; italics mine).  
Commodification, property and intellectual property 
The rise of synbio may have a disenchanting effect on our general view of life. It is said to 
undermine the categorial distinction between the “made” and the “grown”, which is 
supposedly constitutive for the way we see ourselves and the rest of living nature (Pottage 
2007, 323, citing Habermas). The ethical panel that was installed by Venter himself hinted in 
1999 that the general public might wrongly interpret the new developments in science as if 
life were reducible to or nothing more than DNA, thus threatening the view that “life is 
special” (for a discussion, see Van den Belt 2009b).   
Such cultural responses have much to do with the relentless “informatization” of the 
biological world that is going on for some decades now and of which synbio is only the most 
recent expression. In the early 1980s Jeremy Rifkin, the well-known critic of biotechnology, 
was already exceptionally farsighted when he speculated that future generations would inhabit 
a world in which nature was “no longer something they are born into but rather something 
they program” (Rifkin 1984, 23). He expected the computer and information sciences to 
become “the means of communication humankind will use to reorder living material in the 
biotechnical age” (ibid., 21). His prophecy seems realized at last in the current age of synbio. 
Life itself is increasingly understood in terms of “information processing” or “computation” 
and cells and organisms are seen as computers that can be easily (re)programmed according to 
our wishes. Rather than evolving naturally (the “grown”), living beings become the product of 
deliberate design (the “made”). 
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Such views also tend to inform intellectual property legislation. A case in point is the way 
living organisms are considered in patent law. The European Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Directive 98/44/EC) gives the following definition 
of the key object of protection: “… ‘biological material’ means any material containing 
genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological 
system” (art. 2.1 sub a). Notice that not just genes and cells but complete organisms can be 
brought under this definition. During political debates on the implementation of the Directive 
in the Netherlands in 2003-2004, several members of parliament expressed concern that the 
new legislation would reduce living beings to the status of biological material. In response to 
this concern, cabinet ministers pointed out that “all living beings consist of biological 
material, but of course are more than just biological material” (Dutch Parliament 2004, 23ff). 
This facile defense is rather disingenuous, however, as organisms clearly meet the definition 
of “biological material” given in the Directive and on that count must be held to be such 
material (besides, the Directive declares entire organisms to be patentable). There is no escape 
from the conclusion that in modern patent law plants and animals are being reduced to the 
status of raw material or carrier of genetic information. To some extent this even holds for 
human beings, although the human body and its parts have been expressly declared 
unpatentable – at least in their “natural state”, because isolated human genes are patentable 
just like other isolated genes.9 
Jane Calvert has moved the “co-construction” thesis one big step further by arguing, 
somewhat speculatively, that the requirements of intellectual property law may in their turn 
also influence the very content of science (Calvert 2008; Calvert 2010). She propounds the 
tentative argument that synbio is following a reductionist engineering approach to biology 
precisely, or at least partly, with the preconceived aim of making biological systems or parts 
of biological systems better conform to the characteristics of fungible “commodities”, that is, 
“things” or objects of property that can be exchanged on the market. This aim is promoted by 
making biological parts discrete and interchangeable, by ensuring modularity, and by 
realizing reliable and predictable performance of the assembled systems: “In forcing biology 
into the mould of engineering, by developing discrete and substitutable parts, synthetic 
biology is simultaneously making biology better fit intellectual property regimes. This is no 
coincidence, because patent law developed in the context of industrial manufacturing … It is 
also consistent with the direction of biotechnology more generally, which can be seen as 
‘relentlessly pursuing the program of making every element of the world programmable or 
susceptible to engineering’ (Pottage, 2007: 340)” (Calvert 2008, 392-93). 
Calvert addresses an obvious objection against her sweeping thesis. How about the synthetic 
biologists of the BioBricks school who are enthusiastically creating a commons of standard 
                                                          
9 Article 4 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, adopted 
by the UNESCO in 1997, states: “The human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to 
financial gains” (my italics). Due to the added qualification “in its natural state”, this article is 
completely toothless and meaningless. It is an empty gesture to defend human dignity that 
does not prevent the patenting of parts of the human genome by invoking the “isolation 
contrivance” (Palombi). By the way, how could you obtain financial gain from the human 
genome “in its natural state”? 
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biological parts? Aren’t they precisely motivated to keep patents at bay as much as they can, 
rather than trying to lock up their materials and tools in exclusive property rights? Calvert 
recognizes that the BioBricks program with its stress on modularity and the use of 
interchangeable parts makes the biological components more similar to software code: “One 
advantage of modularity is that several different researchers can work on different parts 
simultaneously, meaning that the field can develop faster. In this way, modularity is well-
suited to open source principles, and many synthetic biologists are ideologically committed to 
open source, to such an extent that the aspiration to make their work open source is a guiding 
principle of the field” (Calvert 2010; italics mine). Calvert points out, however, that open 
source itself depends on the existence of prior property rights, as in the case of free software 
where the GPL license is based on copyright: “Rather than being a substitute for intellectual 
property, open source is perhaps more correctly conceived of as a mosaic of private property 
[ref. omitted].  For this reason appropriation is just as important in open source as it is in more 
conventional property rights [ref. omitted]” (Calvert 2008, 392).  
Calvert’s point is formally correct, but also tends to inflate the influence of (intellectual) 
property norms on the content of biological science beyond measure.10 Another critical point 
is her assumption that so-called “intellectual property rights” (here used as an umbrella term 
for patents, copyrights, trademarks, breeders’ rights and the like) can indeed be considered a 
proper subset of property rights. The meaning of the term “commodities” in both contexts is 
quite different. In the economic world of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, “commodities” were 
first and foremost material goods possessing both use-value and exchange-value that could 
literally change hands on the market, or in other words, objects of real, tangible property (for 
Marx, “labour-power” was already a very special and exceptional “commodity”; it took a real 
tour de force to fit that notion into the framework of political economy). It has always been 
extremely difficult to see what the exact “object” is that is protected by an intellectual 
property right – such as a literary “work” in copyright law, or an “invention” in patent law. So 
much is clear that a “work” may not be identified with a particular copy of a book and an 
“invention” may not be identified with the concrete technical “embodiment” of the inventive 
idea. The “objects” of IP rights are rather to be seen as “abstract goods” (Drahos 1996). This 
would make them very spooky “commodities” indeed. In fact, they only become tradable 
“commodities” of sorts thanks to the granting of exclusive rights, that is, rights of exclusion – 
and not the other way around, i.e., they do not have to be “commodities” (in whatever sense) 
to fulfill the requirements of copyright or patent law. 
The term “intellectual property” has only come into general use after 1970. The fact that a 
variety of disparate rights have been successfully lumped together under this general heading 
                                                          
10 Amy Kapczynski makes a similar point: “The GPL, of course, also necessarily relies on 
copyright law for its effects, and it is now frequently pointed out that in this sense, its 
licensing scheme depends upon copyright law” (Kapczynski 2008, 877). For her, however, 
this is an illustration of what she calls “law’s gravitational pull” and of the framing effect of 
the dominant IP frame on the adherents of the A2K frame. One is also reminded of the rather 
hilarious fact that the founder of the free software movement, Richard Stallman, was alarmed 
by the proposal of the Swedish Pirate Party to limit the copyright term to five years only, as 
this would also undermine free software (Stallman 2009).    
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is itself a sign of the “propertization” of IP rights (Lemley 2005). The uncritical, taken-for-
granted use of the expression “intellectual property” has also contributed to the rise of the “IP 
frame” since about 1980 due to its powerful framing effects (Kapcynski 2008, 842 ff). In 
earlier times, the expression was used much more sporadically and not always with the same 
meanings that are nowadays attached to it. In Robert Merton’s sociology of science, for 
instance, intellectual property rights primarily refer to the recognition and esteem, or 
academic “credit”, which are due to scientific researchers who have made important 
discoveries, and surely not to any economic exploitation rights with regard to these 
discoveries (for a more extensive discussion, see Van den Belt 2010). 
To show the historical contrast with an earlier century, I will quote extensively from a 
parliamentary speech of the Dutch Minister of Justice, Anthony Modderman, who in 1881 
defended a new bill for the regulation of copyright (or authors’ right) by explicitly rejecting 
the very notion of “intellectual property rights”: 
“All property rests on the possibility of a perfect physical possession; furthermore, it is also 
characteristic for property that its enjoyment by one person excludes or limits its enjoyment 
by another. […] 
Why do we say that the sea – properly understood, the open sea, not the coastal waters – is 
not susceptible to property?  
Hugo Grotius already taught us why. It is because the open sea does not lend itself to 
exclusive physical possession; also, because its enjoyment by one person does not exclude 
the enjoyment of it by another. 
The same holds, despite all other differences, for our divulged thoughts – in whatever form 
they may have been revealed.  
One may keep one’s thoughts to oneself or one may express them; but once one has 
expressed one’s thoughts, they become the common property [gemeen goed, literally 
“common good”] of all who have been willing to listen to us or to read us and who have 
absorbed these thoughts. Furthermore, the enjoyment or the benefit that one person derives 
from them in no way diminishes the enjoyment or the benefit that they may yield to 
someone else.  
You will understand the tenor of these remarks. They do not aim to dispute the awarding of 
a (temporary) exclusive right to reproduce the products of our minds. They rather intend to 
remove from the debate the false name of ‘intellectual property right’; a name destined to 
lighten the burden of the opponents [of copyright protection]. What the Government 
defends is a right on its own; a right sui generis, to be assigned as such and to be regulated 
by law.” (Auteurswet 2006, 59; my translation). 
Minister Modderman thus argued that what is sometimes called “intellectual property” is not 
property at all. We can find echoes here of Thomas Jefferson’s famous comments on the non-
rivalry and non-excludability of ideas, which make them singularly unfit for property 
(Jefferson 1813). The government may grant temporary exclusive rights to protect literary 
works (copyright) or inventions (patent law), but such legal protection is not based on the 
(false) notion of “intellectual property rights”. This was the view behind the so-called “IP 
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clause” (a retrospective name!) in the US Constitution of 1787 as well as the Dutch copyright 
bill of 1881.              
Patents, health, and global justice 
It is still too early to discuss the potential medical applications of synbio and the ethical and 
legal questions they would raise with regard to patenting in concrete detail. However, an 
intense international debate is already going on about the ethical implications of patents in the 
medical area in terms of the human right to health, access to essential medicines and global 
justice. As the discussion on the ethical aspects of medical synbio applications is likely to be 
placed into this wider debate, it may be useful to sketch the main outlines of this debate in the 
final part of this paper. 
It was the worldwide HIV/AIDS crisis that raised widespread awareness about the morally 
problematic character of drug patents, especially when western pharmaceutical companies 
were at first emboldened by the TRIPS Agreement of 1995 to assert their enhanced IP rights 
with much more vigor than before. A temporary (20-year-long) monopoly on a new drug that 
a patent affords may help a pharmaceutical company to recoup its investments in research and 
development. The other side of the coin is that millions and millions of poor patients, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are doomed to die prematurely while the patented medicines 
that could save their lives or at least alleviate their suffering are beyond their reach due to 
high monopoly prices (Forman 2007). Economist Joseph Stiglitz even compared the 
pharmaceutical companies with Scrooge, the repulsive character in Charles Dickens’s 
Christmas Carol, because they seemed to care so much more for their sacrosanct IP rights 
than for the horrible fate of poor Africans (Stiglitz 2006). 
As any economics textbook explains, a monopoly will lead to a static inefficiency or welfare 
loss that is known as a “deadweight loss”. Because the monopoly price is so much higher than 
the marginal cost price, a patent monopoly on a drug will prevent transactions with all those 
potential users who are able and willing to pay more than the marginal cost but not the full 
monopoly price of the patented drug.11 In the case of patents for essential, live-saving 
medicines, this “market failure” leads to morally unacceptable situations. 
Since the turn of the century the situation with regard to HIV/AIDS has considerably 
improved, as a consequence of the heavy moral pressure exerted by NGOs like Oxfam and 
Médecins Sans Frontières on pharmaceutical companies to lower drug prices, the increased 
credibility of the threat of compulsory licensing in the wake of the Doha Declaration of 2001, 
and increased competition from generic manufacturers. In general, prices for HIV/AIDS 
medicines in developing countries have dropped quite drastically in the last decade. 
                                                          
11 Grootendorst (2009) cites quantitative calculations that indicate that the dead-weight loss in 
the US pharma market may be no less than 60 percent of sales revenues, while other 
investigations show that the relative size of the dead-weight loss in developing countries 
might even be much higher. It is clear that, simply in economic terms, enormous amounts are 
involved. 
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Although NGOs hold that what has been achieved until now is not nearly enough, others 
might have doubts about whether continuing to put pressure on companies to lower their 
prices still further until they come close to the level of marginal costs is the right way to 
proceed in the search for solutions to global health problems. Pharmaceutical companies 
wonder why they are singled out for special treatment to contribute to the solution of a 
problem that they did not create. They also point out that it is incorrect to look at the prices of 
patented medicines only from a static  point of view. After all, patents are temporary 
monopolies that are precisely intended as incentives to stimulate the search for new 
medicines. No patents, no innovation. Higher prices in the present (until the competition of 
generics after the expiration of the patent brings them down) are simply the “price” we all 
have to pay to enjoy the fruits of progress. A substantial erosion of price margins might well 
endanger pharmaceutical innovation. Finally, a strategy of differential pricing (i.e. charging 
low prices in poor countries and high prices in wealthy countries) is also not sustainable, as 
the low-priced medicines will easily find their way to high-income countries through 
smuggling. 
The philosopher Thomas Pogge, who has thought long and hard about the working of the 
international patent system from the perspective of global justice, agrees that one should not 
consider the problem exclusively from the point of view of static efficiency but also take into 
account the dynamic role of the patent system to foster innovation (Pogge 2005). However, 
one cannot simply trade off dynamic efficiency (innovation) against static inefficiency (lack 
of access to existing medicines). Pogge insists that access to essential medicines is a human 
right that is to be secured by a just international system. This human right cannot be sacrificed 
on the altar of pharmaceutical innovation. Even more, when looked at from a dynamic 
perspective, the international patent system does not meet the requirements of global justice 
either: it generates innovations, indeed, but it does not generate the right kind of innovations. 
As financial incentives, patents operate by orienting research towards the needs of the wealthy 
and the affluent, that is, those who exercise effective demand backed up by purchasing power, 
and not towards the needs of the poor and needy who are unable to do so. The well-known 
“10/90 gap” illustrates this defect: “Only 10 percent of global health research is devoted to 
conditions that account for 90 percent of the global disease burden” (Drugs for Neglected 
Diseases Working Group 2001, 10). There are therefore many “neglected” diseases, 
especially in the Tropics, which fail to receive adequate attention from the international 
research community. 
Pogge concludes that any proposal for a re-design of the international patent system in the 
field of medicines has to solve two problems simultaneously: 
(a) The access problem (cf. deadweight loss) 
(b) The availability problem (cf. the 10/90 gap) 
Pogge has proposed his own institutional solution for dealing with these two problems, the so-
called Health Impact Fund, which has been further elaborated with the help of others (see 
Hollis and Pogge 2008; Singer and Schroeder 2010). Whatever one thinks of the merits of 
 16 
Pogge’s reform proposal, he certainly deserves credit for bringing home so clearly that these 
twin problems define a major part of the task-set for any attempt at institutional re-design.  
In Pogge’s view, an international public fund based on obligatory contributions (mostly) from 
developed countries, the Health Impact Fund, should be established to create the possibility of 
rewarding pharmaceutical companies for developing essential medicines, the size of their 
reward being proportional to the impact of their invention on the global disease burden. In 
essence, the scheme means that companies are offered a choice. Once they have taken out a 
patent for a new drug, they can either attempt to earn money on it in the usual way by 
exploiting the monopoly and setting prices that affluent markets can bear, or they can choose 
the option of registering with the Fund and being rewarded according to a formula that is 
geared to the health impact of the new drug (measured in terms of QALYs). In the latter case 
the drug is made available to generic manufacturers who will offer it at a price slightly above 
production cost. The second option would entail a different metric of success for the drug 
company. Success will not be measured then in terms of net sales to those who can afford to 
pay the high prices of a monopolized invention, but in terms of the reduction of the global 
disease burden, irrespective of the purchasing power of those who suffer from it. In this way it 
is hoped that the Health Impact Fund will redress the existing imbalance of availability 
(epitomized by the “10/90 gap”) by providing incentives that are not geared to purchasing 
power but to medical need. Competition from generic manufacturers will ensure that the 
problem of access is also addressed. (For a detailed exposition of the whole scheme, see 
Hollis and Pogge 2008). 
Several commentators have questioned the political and practical feasibility of the Health 
Impact Fund. One critical issue is funding. The whole initiative needs initially some 6 billion 
dollars from governments or other contributors to take off. Will such funds really be 
forthcoming and can pharmaceutical companies base their long-term R&D decisions with any 
confidence on government pledges to provide funds over a longer period of time? “Providing 
public funds to drug companies is unlikely to be politically popular: competing demands will 
always seem more urgent and desirable” (Buchanan, Cole and Keohane 2009, 21). It has also 
been pointed out that the measurement procedure for assessing the impact of a new medicine 
on the global disease burden is rather complex, which would make the assessment vulnerable 
to corruption (Sonderholm 2010). 
Here I would like to draw attention to another critical feature of Pogge’s reform proposal, 
namely the notable fact that the whole scheme still relies very strongly on the “incentivizing” 
effect of patents.12 The main problem with the present patent system, in Pogge’s view, is that 
                                                          
12 As Singer and Schroeder explain: “The Health Impact Fund leaves intact strong incentives 
for the pharmaceutical industry around the globe, thereby preserving the TRIPS advantages, 
whilst mitigating its main challenge, namely to block access to life-saving medicines to the 
poor. By registering a patented medicine with the Fund, a firm would agree to sell it globally 
at cost. In exchange, the firm would receive, for a fixed time, payments based on the 
product’s assessed global health impact. The arrangement would be optional and it would not 
diminish patent rights, it therefore aligns the interests of pharmaceutical companies with the 
interests of poor patients. Such a win-win situation has to be welcomed!” (Singer and 
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the incentives are geared to (potential) market demand in wealthy countries that is backed up 
by purchasing power. The “trick” of Pogge’s scheme is to leverage the unmet medical needs 
of the South by backing them up with additional funds, so that they too carry some weight in 
the market pull directing pharmaceutical innovation. It is all a matter of setting the incentives 
“straight” – but by the same token the scheme still counts on the role of patents as incentives.  
The pharmaceutical  industry is usually seen as a sector where patents are indispensible for 
innovation, due to high investment costs of R&D and the relative ease to reverse engineer any 
resulting product. Lately, however, the presumed “incentivizing” effect of patents even for the 
pharma sector is increasingly called into question. For one thing, the track record of the 
industry over the recent period is not particularly impressive (even apart from the global 
imbalance epitomized in the 10/90 gap). Official figures show that in the last three decades 
“the productivity of the pharma R&D enterprise – the number of new molecules brought to 
market per dollar spent on R&D – has declined markedly” (Grootendorst 2009, 2). This 
productivity slowdown occurred in a period when new technologies like genomics, 
combinatorial chemistry and knock-out mice were supposed to make the drug discovery 
process more rapid and more efficient. The conditioned reflex of the pharma industry to a 
drying pipeline of new inventions is to clamor for more patent protection, but the fact of the 
matter is that their wishes on this score have been answered rather well during the past 
decades. Ironically, some hard-boiled economic analyses locate the root of the problem in the 
patent system itself  and the very high profit margins that it generates. Grootendorst sums up 
the social costs that are caused by the current system of pharmaceutical innovation centered 
on patents: (1) the costs to the healthcare system of medication non-compliance due to higher 
drug prices; (2) the resources consumed in the battle over the innovator’s profits; (3) the 
resources spent by the innovator to expand unit sales and extend patents; (4) the increased 
costs of pharma R&D when this R&D builds on patented upstream discoveries; (5) the 
distortions in research direction caused by non-patentability of certain compounds; and (6) the 
administrative costs of the patent system (Grootendorst 2009, 32).13 To this list can be added 
the unknown but most likely very considerable extent of bias and distortions in the medical 
literature due to widespread practices like “ghost management” and “publication planning” 
that result from the dominance of marketing imperatives over the research process (Sismondo 
and Doucet 2010). 
Thus there is every reason to question Pogge’s assumption that patents are indispensible as 
incentives for innovation. For the members of the “A2K” coalition there is, of course, nothing 
extraordinary in this conclusion. As Amy Kapczynski remarks: “The production process of 
free and open-source software is central to the imaginary of the A2K mobilization because it 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Schroeder 2010, 17). 
13 In Grootendorst’s paper, each of these rubrics of social costs is further specified and 
discussed in detail. A very interesting category is the second rubric. When a patent allows 
very high profit margins on a certain drug, this will attract others seeking their share of the 
spoils. A lot of effort is simply wasted on keeping these rent-seekers at bay: “The innovator 
will need to spend resources fending off counterfeiters, resellers, competing drug companies 
(both generic and branded me-toos), and negotiating with and lobbying price regulators and 
drug insurers …” (Grootendorst 2009, 32).   
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offers a model of collaborative, distributed innovation that does not rely on the incentivizing 
effect of IP rights” (Kapczynski 2008, 869-870). Another plank of the “A2K” platform is that 
“under no circumstances can human rights be subordinated to intellectual property protection” 
(Kapczynski 2008, 866). It seems that Pogge got stuck half-way between the IP frame and the 
A2K frame.            
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